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Introduction
The National Basketball Association (NBA), Agents (or teams), respond to incentives
just as any other actors would in a market. As many economists have noted (Taylor and
Trodgon; Price et al) the NBA is a good a representation of what is known as tournament theory.
Tournament theory, developed by Lazear and Rosen (1981), focuses on rank- based rewards and,
incentives based on performance relative to other agents. Reward for effort is based only on
performance compared to competitors, it doesn’t matter how well you do if it falls short
compared to other agents taking part in the same tournament. Thus, this theory predicts that the
greater the reward, the greater effort a team will exert. In professional sports, including the NBA,
the better a team performs the greater chance they have of making the post season and winning a
championship. Being a winning and successful teams brings along with it not only additional
revenue from added games, but also fame, which in turn leads to increased media coverage,
advertisements, and fans becoming more invested in the team, then in turn leads to a higher
demand for tickets, as well as attracting successful and star players. All of these contribute to a
team’s overall prestige and revenue.
In many professional sports, an entry draft takes place in between seasons in which teams
have an opportunity to select amateur players who are eligible to become professionals. Teams
that do not qualify for the postseason, and thus do not have an opportunity to win the
championship, are given higher draft picks in an effort to maintain equality and competitive
balance in the league. The worst teams get the highest draft picks. However, based on the
tournament model discussed previously, this implies that teams have an incentive to exert less
effort in order to perform worse off and thus receive a higher draft pick. This would allow the
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team to acquire a player of higher quality than they may deserve based on the teams overall
talent when compared to the rest of the team. A team that is not good enough to qualify for the
playoffs but better than many of its competitors who also will not qualify could lose intentionally
to acquire a better player, which the teams that are actually worse off deserve. This strategy
throws the entire point of this draft system, which is to maintain competitive balance, into
disarray.
Starting in 1966 year the NBA initially put into place a straightforward reverse order
draft. The worst two teams from each conference would flip a coin to determine who gets the 1 st
pick and from then on the teams would pick based on reverse rank. For the 1984-1985 season
the NBA changed the draft system in response to increasing pressure and allegation that teams
were tanking or losing on purpose in order to increase their draft position. The system was
changed so that each team that did not make the playoffs was given an equal chance to gain the
first overall draft pick in a lottery system. The system used today was put in place for the 19891990 season, in an effort to increase parity throughout the league, as the league office felt the
competitive balance was being compromised by the equally-weighted system. Although it was
modified in 1992-1993, giving more weight to the worse teams to insure they received higher
draft picks, teams with the worst records were given a greater probably of landing the number
one pick and so forth. In a format such as this when a team is eliminated from playoff
contention, they have no incentive to continue to win games and actually have an incentive to
lose more so than their competitors in order to increase their odds of securing a higher draft pick.
If a team, once eliminated, loses more than its competitors who have also been eliminated, then
they have a better a chance of gaining a better player, and thus, an advantage over the other
teams.

3|H alli sey

Tanking in the NBA
The issue of shirking or ‘tanking’ (losing on purpose) is the most prevalent in the NBA
among major sports and is often a topic of much debate and discussion amongst the sports
media. The NBA and basketball as a whole consist of teams with only five competitors on the
floor at any given time. This is much, much less than any other major sport that has a similar
lottery system that might create an incentive to lose. In baseball, a sport that fields nine players,
and where around 20 make significant contributions, less than half of players picked after the
first round make the major leagues, and even those that are first round draft picks, where 80%
make it, there isn’t a great chance that they will make major contributions. If they do, it will most
likely be years in advance (Kennedy 2015). In the NFL, high draft picks are certainly more
valuable and coveted. However teams start 22 players (11 on offense and 11 on defense), and
limiting one player’s ability to make a team go from mediocre to championship contender.
In the NBA a single player can change a team’s fortunes. Michael Jordan carried the bulls
to six championships; Lebron James’ teams haven’t missed the playoffs since 2006, when he was
still in the first few years of his career; the Dirk Nowitzki led Dallas Mavericks haven’t missed
the playoffs since 2000, despite the entire roster constantly changing along with numerous
coaching changes. The NBA is a league centered on stars, not only from a winning perspective
but from a money perspective. One of the most effective ways to acquire stars in basketball is
through the draft, and the majority of stars in the draft are taken within the top three picks. Price
et al, using data from Berri (2008), track the probability of gaining a superstar in the top 3 picks
of the draft. They use Berri’s data on the wins an average NBA player provides and define a
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superstar as someone who provides contributes twice as many wins as the average player.
According to their data, the 1st pick has over a 30% chance of achieving superstar status. The 2nd
and 3rd, picks while a cut above the rest, show similar statistics to each other and are significantly
below the 1st pick. Roland Beech (2009), a data analyst who currently works for the Sacramento
Kings of the NBA, created a similar metric to define a star player and calculated that the first
five picks of the draft have a significantly higher (approximately 60-75% compared to 20-35%)
chance of becoming a star when compared to the rest of the field. To win in the NBA, you need
dominant, star players, and one of the best ways to attain them is through the draft, especially
considering NBA rookies are signed to rookie scale contracts for their first four years. This
allows teams to pay a potential star they have drafted much less than they would a player of
equal talent in free agency, allowing them to sign other players in order to improve their team.
The NBA is also one of the least competitively balanced professional sports. Since the
1985-86 season, the year the current lottery format was put into place, only nine teams have won
championships and other than the Mavericks and Warriors, all of them have won multiple titles.
This trend looks set to continue this year as well as both the Spurs and Warriors (both previous
winners) are heavy favorites to win the championship. That is only 30% of teams in the NBA
that have won a championship in the past 30 years. In Major League Baseball since the same
year, 19 different teams have won titles, over 63% of teams. In the NFL 15 different teams have
won titles, almost 47%. For the most part, in the NBA the good teams remain good and the bad
teams stay bad. This unevenness encourages mediocre teams to use any means they can to gain
an advantage, such as losing on purpose, in order to give them a chance to be competitive.
Economists have attempted to create models in the past that prove that teams do in fact
lose on purpose, or ‘tank’. These past examples use tournament theory developed by Lazear and
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Rosen as a basis, which predicts that if teams have an incentive to lose then they will do so. The
question then becomes if teams did tank, how it has impacted the team’s future outcomes, and is
there a noticeable difference between teams that did not tank and teams that did?

Overview
This section first reviews past studies by economists, including Taylor and Trogdon, as
well as Price et al, who have created models and data in an attempt to demonstrate whether or
not teams do in fact lose on purpose. Both of these papers make a compelling argument in favor
of teams tanking. Then, taking the fact that tanking does take place as given, I create a simplified
model using win percentage before and after elimination in order to confirm their studies and
show that this method also indicates that teams tanked, as the evidence from this method
coincides with both studies. It is then used to select specific teams in order study the outcome
that tanking had on teams that took part in it. The four teams selected all have demonstrated
patterns that suggest that they shirked in some way over the given period. The years following
this period of perceived tanking are then looked at to determine the impact that losing on
purpose had on each franchise, and if it was positive, and if there is any similar patterns between
the teams. Two teams that appeared to have not engaged in this manner of tanking are also
looked at to see if there are any comparisons to be made. Although, it may be difficult to draw
any conclusions from, as it is much more difficult to pinpoint and define teams that were not in
fact tanking. It is of my belief that tanking by itself is not enough for a team to improve its
fortunes substantially. In addition some manner of luck and signing good players has a major
impact, although tanking may encourage the ability to do this effectively.
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Past Studies/Literature
Using tournament theory as a basis, once teams in the NBA have nothing to play for, i.e.
can no longer win the championship by way of being eliminated from playoff contention, they
should in theory lose on purpose in order to enhance their draft position. Various economists
have attempted to study and prove that this phenomenon does in fact exist by creating models.
In 2003 Trogdon and Taylor looked at 3 different seasons of the NBA. In each season a
different method was used to determine the draft order. The 1 st season they looked at used a
straightforward reverse-order draft, from the 1983-84 season. They then looked at the season
where there was an equally weighted lottery. Finally, they analyzed the current system in place:
the weighted lottery. Trogdon and Taylor then created a model to predict a team’s likelihood to
win a game, taking into account various factors. Using this model on the three seasons they
looked at their evidence showed that in the season that used the straightforward reverse-order
draft, as well as the current system, teams that were eliminated from the playoffs were much
more likely to lose than teams that had clinched the playoffs, even when controlling for quality
of the teams and whether the game took place home or away. The system where each nonplayoff team was given the same chance to receive the number one overall pick showed no
evidence that teams, once eliminated, were more likely to lose. This coincides with tournament
theory that Taylor and Trogdon based this study upon, as there was no incentive for a team
eliminated to lose.
In 2010, Price et al, created a similar model to that of Taylor and Trogdon (2003) in order
to extend their research onto a large subset of data. There results, from 1977-2007, show similar
conclusions to that of Taylor and Trogdon. Although, they found that tanking in the 1984 season
and before, when there was a s straight reverse-order draft, was much less prevalent and only
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occurred in certain years. They also found that tanking was most prevalent shortly after the
adjusted weighted lottery system was put into place in 1992. The next 7 seasons showed the most
obvious evidence that tanking took place.
Soebbing and Humphreys (2011) also attempted to analyze evidence as to whether or not
there was a possibility teams tanked. However, instead of creating likelihood models similar to
what the two previous works discussed, they looked at betting odds for the NBA and if they
showed any shift towards the end of the season that would indicate that teams tanked when they
had an incentive to do so. Their evidence found that that betting markets show evidence that
they believe teams do tank by a change in point spreads towards the end of the season once
teams are eliminated.
Borland (2009) conducted a study to analyze whether or not tanking occurred in a
different sport: Australian Rules Football (AFL). The study was inspired by various literatures
put forth by economists that there was evidence that teams did in fact tank in the NBA. The AFL
pits teams of 18 against one another and features a similar straightforward reverse-order draft
that the NBA used before the 1985 season. Under this format Taylor and Trogdon found
evidence in the NBA that tanking took place, while Price et al found similar evidence, albeit not
as strong as it only took place during certain seasons. Borland creates a similar model to analyze
the likelihood that teams tank in the AFL. Borland’s results showed that there is no evidence that
tanking takes place in the AFL. Borland speculates that tanking does not take place because the
cost of tanking is much greater than the benefit in this particular sport. With 18 players on the
field, one highly talented player is much less likely to have a great enough impact to offset the
cost of losing on purpose that can affect things such as revenue. This result coincides with the
discussion put forth previously in this paper that tanking is more prevalent in the NBA than in
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other sports where there may be an incentive to tank partly due to the small number of players
(5) on the court at a given time and the impact that one individual player can have.

Data
If we take it as given that the models created above by various economists support the
likelihood that tanking does exist in the NBA in the form of teams losing intentionally once they
are eliminated from the playoffs, then a simplified model using win percentage before and after a
team’s elimination should show similar results. This data can then be used to select teams that
appeared to have tanked and not tanked and analyze the team’s outcomes after said tanking
occurred. Table 1 below shows the collective win percentage of every team aggregated together
before and after they were eliminated from the playoffs from the 1994-1995 season to the 20042005 season. This data was collected by first identifying each team that did not make the
playoffs each season, finding the date they were mathematically eliminated from the playoffs,
and then comparing the teams win percentage before they were eliminated to after elimination.
The total games played for every team before elimination for that season was then divided by the
total number of wins before elimination to find the total win percentage before elimination. The
same thing was then done for each team and aggregated together after elimination. Table 2,
below, shows an example of the data for one season in particular that was analyzed.
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Table 1
Season

Before

After

Difference

94-95

0.373

0.259

-0.114

95-96

0.361

0.270

-0.091

96-97

0.322

0.276

-0.046

97-98

0.325

0.263

-0.062

98-99

0.341

0.267

-0.074

99-00

0.341

0.348

+0.070

00-01

0.365

0.324

-0.041

01-02

0.372

0.341

-0.031

02-03

0.382

0.298

-0.084

03-04

0.392

0.326

-0.066

Total

0.359

0.297

-0.062

Average

-0.054

As you can see in Table 1, showing every season from 1994 to 2004 , teams once
eliminated from the playoffs, collectively lost more games on average, or got worse than they
were prior to elimination overall and in every season except for one. Approximately 60% of
teams, once eliminated from the playoffs, saw their win percentage fall. Although this is a much
more simplistic variation it does serves to support the conclusions put forth by both Taylor and
Trogdon, and Price et al. It also show similar results to Price et al’s findings that teams tanked
more so after the lotteyr weight was adjusted going into the 1993 season. This data shows that
the biggest drop in win percentage did occur in the seasons following the 1993 season. However,
their data supported the idea that taking was most prevalent all the way until 2000. It is important
to note that their data also used various control and dummy variables to make their predictions
more accurate so the win percentage shown above does not necessarily disprove their findings.
Due to the overall findings in this data supporting previous studies showing tanking, it
can then be used to select specific teams that exhibited tanking patterns. Table 2 shows the
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example of data for one season. The data for a single team can then be taken over this 10 year
period to observe whether or not the team saw a consistent drop in win percentage after
elimination, which would suggest a strong likelihood that a team tanked. Based on this concept,
four teams were selected that exhibited this pattern. Teams were selected by looking at their win
percentage season by season before and after elimination, and then pinpointing consecutive
seasons where they were eliminated with around 10 games or more left to play and their win
percentage dropped after elimination. Some teams below were also selected that saw their win
percentage drop after elimination but were eliminated with less than 10 games to play. However,
this drop off, although over a briefer segment, allowed them to fall below other teams in the
standings; giving them greater odds at a higher draft pick. After this, their following seasons
were observed in order to analyze if tanking has any consistent effect, positive or otherwise, on
teams that took part in it. Two teams that appeared to not practice tanking are also selected and
looked at to help show both sides. These two teams consistently missed the playoffs over the
given period, however, after elimination, even when they had 10-20 games left to play, rarely, if
at all, saw their win percentage fall. Only two teams were selected for this portion as very few
teams exhibited a consistent trend of a non-falling win percentage after elimination from the
playoffs.
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Table 2 (example year)
2002-2003
Team Win PCT

Date elim

games left

Before

After

DEN

0.207

5-Mar

20

0.194

0.250

CLE

0.207

7-Mar

20

0.177

0.300

TOR

0.293

30-Mar

10

0.319

0.100

MIA

0.305

23-Mar

12

0.314

0.250

LAC

0.329

21-Mar

14

0.324

0.357

MEM

0.341

26-Mar

11

0.366

0.182

CHI

0.366

29-Mar

8

0.351

0.500

ATL

0.427

8-Apr

5

0.403

0.800

WAS

0.451

12-Apr

2

0.463

0.000

NYK

0.451

11-Apr

3

0.456

0.333

GSW

0.463

9-Apr

4

0.487

0.000

SEA

0.488

11-Apr

3

0.494

0.333

HOU

0.524

12-Apr

2

0.512

1.000

0.382

0.298

Total

Team by Team-Tanking Teams
Los Angeles Clippers
The Los Angeles Clippers (LAC) have a history of being below average up until very
recently. In the 10-year period analyzed, the Clippers made the playoffs only one time, and
never had a win percentage above .500. In 6 of the 8 seasons in which they were eliminated
from playoff contention, the Clippers win percentage dropped after they were mathematically
eliminated. The graph below shows the win percentage before and after elimination in each
season that the clippers failed to make the playoffs. (The Clippers were eliminated from the
playoffs with at least 7 or more games to play every season except for 2001-2002).
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LAC Win PCT
0.600
Win Percentage

0.500

0.400
0.300

Win PCT Before

0.200

Win PCT After

0.100

Total Win PCT

0.000

Year

The most clear indication of the Clippers using tanking tactics appears between 1994 and
1998, a period of four seasons. As shown in the LAC graph above, for both the 94-95 and 95-96
seasons the Clippers were eliminated with 17 and 7 games left, respectively, and after
elimination they saw a dip in win production. Although the Clippers were able to earn a playoff
spot in the 1996-1997 Season, despite their losing record, they were eliminated from contention
the next season (97-98) with 18 games to play and proceeded to win only three of their
remaining games.
After the 1995 season the Clippers were lucky enough to receive the 2 nd overall pick,
which they then traded for a player and a mid-first round draft pick. The rookie they drafted,
Brent Barry, and the player they traded for, helped them improve their record the following year,
although once again they showed evidence of tanking; winning only two of their last seven
games, which was a decent margin below their season average. In the following season the
clippers continued to improve. Although they posted a losing record they were able to make the
playoffs, where they were eliminated in the first round. The following year (97-98) however, the
Clippers collapsed early on after playing poorly and due to an injury to a key player, and
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proceeded to trade away many of their young players, including the promising Brent Barry. As
mentioned above, they proceeded to win only 3 of their remaining 18 games. The clippers once
again received a top three pick. This time; they drafted Michael Olowokandi with the first overall
pick, a promising big man, who in the end turned out to be one of the biggest busts in draft
history.
In the following 6 seasons, as shown in the graph above, The Clippers lingered towards
the bottom of the league, although they began to show signs of improvement before once again
plummeting to the bottom. Twice the Clippers were able to gain a top 3 draft pick, but both
times the pick resulted in having a very limited impact on the teams overall performance. The
team ultimately failed to show consistent improvement through tanking, but gave themselves the
opportunity to do so by gaining two top three picks, which gave them decent chance to land a
star player who could have an impact. As both Beech (2008) and Berri (2009) showed in their
studies discussed earlier in this paper ,the top 3-5 picks are significantly more likely to be a star
compared to the rest of their draft class peers. The Clippers do however; show a trend similar to
the other tanking teams examined in this study. They have periods of very poor performance,
often accompanied, by tanking, followed by a slight increase in win percentage over the
following years, before dropping back down to the bottom, and then improving again slightly.
From this we can speculate that tanking may have improved the prospects for the Clippers, as we
saw them improve after trading their first top-3 draft pick for a player and Brent Barry, however
this improvement was not enough for the Clippers to be a consistent playoff team and thus they
traded away Barry and attempted to tank once again in the 97-98 season. They then once again
received a top overall pick, and again improved over the following years, although not
necessarily due to their draft pick, before once again dipping in performance.
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Boston Celtics
The Boston Celtics traditionally are one of the most competitive teams in the NBA. As of
today they hold the most championships in NBA history, and account for almost 25% of all
championships since the founding of the league in 1946. However in the 90s and early 2000s, the
period studied in this paper (95-04), the Celtics struggled to be competitive. They failed to
qualify for the playoffs for seven straight years, from the 95-96 season to the 00-01 season.

BOS Win PCT
0.700
Win Percentage

0.600
0.500
0.400

Win PCT Before

0.300

Win PCT after

0.200

Total win PCT

0.100
0.000

Year

The above graph shows Boston’s win percentage for the years looked at in this study.
From the 96-97 season to 98-99, the Celtics Win percentage dropped significantly after
elimination from playoff contention. In the 96-97 season the Celtics were eliminated with 21
games left to play and proceeded to win only 3 of their final 21 games. The only team with a
worse record that season, the Vancouver Grizzlies, was eliminated at around the same time as
Boston. Boston then proceeded to perform much worse than the Grizzlies in the run up to the end
of the season, possibly implying that they were attempting to “catch” the Grizzlies in an effort to
increase their odds to secure the number one pick. In the following two seasons (97-98 & 98-99),
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the Celtics exhibited signs of a different sort of tanking, as they were eliminated with much
fewer games remaining in the season; six and five respectively. However, their performance, or
lack thereof, following their elimination in both these seasons allowed their record to become
worse than teams close to them in the standings who had worse records than them leading up to
elimination. By losing games after elimination, Boston was able to secure greater odds of landing
a higher draft pick by decreasing their place in the standings.
Following the 1997 season, the Celtics, with the 2nd worst overall record, received the 3rd
overall pick in the NBA draft. With this pick the Celtics drafted, Chauncey Billups, a player
who would go onto to have an extremely successful NBA career, and would go on to lead the
Detroit Pistons to an NBA championship and be named the Finals Most Valuable Player.
However, the Celtics struggled to develop Billups and felt he would not be successful and traded
him for a more established player only a little more than half-way through his first season with
the team. They also traded for the number six overall pick in the 1997 draft where they selected
Ron Mercer, only to trade him away as well, albeit two seasons later. The Celtics were able to
improve slightly the following two years (97-98,98-99), after receiving a more NBA ready
player for Billups, Ron Mercer being named to the all-rookie team before being traded after the
second season, and drafting future rookie Paul Pierce. It was with Paul Pierce in the 1998 draft
where the Celtics were finally able to strike gold, drafting the perennial all-star with the 10th
overall pick. The Celtics traded their 1999 draft pick for immediate talent, and in the following
years, with the help of Paul Pierce they saw continued improvement, culminating in 4 straight
playoff appearances from 01-’02 to 04-’05.
The Celtics tanking from 1996 to1999 helped them receive numerous high draft picks.
These draft picks did not necessarily contribute directly to team wins but through trades as well
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as the drafting of Paul Pierce they were able to consistently improve. Without the heavy drop off
in performance after elimination in the 98-99 season the Celtics may not have received a high
enough draft pick to draft Pierce. The Boston Celtics serve as a good example of a team that was
able to improve through tanking by gaining immediate talent in the draft through Pierce.

Golden State Warriors
The Golden State Warriors had on and off success in the late 80s and early 90s. However,
in the 10-year window looked at in this paper they failed to make the playoffs a single time, and
would not do so again until the 2006-07 season. In 8 out of these 10 season s Golden State’s win
percentage decreased after being eliminated, as you can see in the graph below showing the
Warrior’s win percentage over the 10-year window.

GSW Win PCT
0.600
0.500
0.400
0.300

Win PCT Before

0.200

Win PCT after
Total Win PCT

0.100
0.000

94-95 95-96 96-97 97-98 98-99 99-00 00-01 01-'02 02-'03 03-'04
Year

As you can see above, the Warriors struggled mightily each season, and saw very little
consistency in terms of record from year to year, while consistently getting worse once
eliminated from contention. However, from the 1999-2000 season to the 01-’02 season Golden
State demonstrated its most obvious signs of tanking. In each of these three seasons the Warriors
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were eliminated with around a month left to play and at least 18 games left or more. In each of
these seasons we see a drop in their win percentage, especially in 99-00 and 00-01.
In the 1999-2000 season the Golden State Warriors struggled mightily, amid midseason
injuries to various players, as well as trading away starters. They were eliminated with 20 games
to play in the season and won only 3 of their final 20 games, finishing with the third worst record
in the NBA. The interesting thing about this instance is that the Warriors did not have a first
round draft pick in the 2000 draft. This calls into question why the Warriors record dropped so
heavily after elimination from the playoffs. This statistic calls into question not only my methods
in pointing out teams that lost on purpose, but also the more advanced methods used by Taylor
and Trogdon, as well as Price et al, as their methods would also show that the Warriors lost more
games in this period then they statistically should have. In the other two seasons where Golden
State did not have a first round draft pick initially (in both they would end up trading for one
after the season), they showed very little signs of tanking. In the 1995-96 season, they were in
playoff contention, barely missing the playoffs and improving as the season went on, and the
1997-98 season, where they actually got better once being eliminated from the playoffs with 18
games left to play.
In the following season, 2000-01, Golden State exhibited maybe the most obvious
tanking of all teams looked at over this 10 year window. They were eliminated with 21 games to
play and proceeded tp win only one of their 21 games, dropping their win percentage from .262
all the way to .207, in the span of only a month. This may have been an effort to gain the worst
overall record, but they fell two games short of catching the Chicago Bulls. The Golden State
Warriors then received the 5th overall pick, and used it to draft Jason Richardson, a guard who
would have a hugely successful NBA career. The following year, Golden State improved slightly
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but still exhibited the familiar signs of tanking as their win percentage fell after being eliminated
with 18 games to play. This time, however, their losing after elimination allowed them to
“catch” the Chicago Bulls and gain the worst overall record in the league. With this record the
Warriors selected Mike Dunleavy, a player who, while not a star as they might have hoped,
became a very solid NBA player and helped lead them, along with free agent signings, and Jason
Richardson, to a playoff appearance in 2007, and a series win. The Warriors struggled in the
seasons following this, however, and traded and let go much of the roster in an effort to rebuild
once again.
Although the Warriors failed to be consistently competitive after tanking they show the
familiar trend of repeatedly improving for a few seasons and then struggling for a few seasons.
After the three year period where it was most blatant that the Warriors tanked, from 1999 to
2002, we also saw the most marked improvement in the years following, culminating in a playoff
appearance.

Memphis (Vancouver) Grizzlies
The Grizzlies were an expansion teams that arrived in the league for the 1995-1996
season. Initially based in Vancouver they were relocated to Memphis for the 2001-2002 season.
In the 10-year window looked at in this study the Grizzlies made the playoffs one time, in the
final season, 2003-2004. The Grizzlies saw their win percentage drop after elimination in the
playoffs in only four of the nine seasons in which they did not make the playoffs. However as
you can see in the graph below, these seasons all happened just about consecutively from 98-99,
to 02-03. The Grizzlies did not exhibit signs of tanking in their first few years in the league,
possibly to attract as many new fans as they could, as a new franchise starting off its career by
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losing game on purpose would certainly not help revenue and overall buzz about the team. After
these first few seasons, the only other year in which the Grizzlies did not appear to tank was their
first year in Memphis, adding to the evidence of a new team shying away from losing
intentionally.

MEM (VAN) Win PCT
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0.400
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The graph above demonstrates the Grizzlies win percentage dropping every season from
98-99 to 02-03, with the exception of the 2001-2002, season, their first in Memphis. In the 1999
NBA draft the Grizzlies received the number two overall pick, thanks to their losing efforts. This
was the second consecutive year the grizzlies received the 2 nd pick, drafting a solid young player
in Mike Bibby the previous year. However, controversy surrounded their draft pick in 1999,
because Steve Francis did not want to play for them and they made the decision to trade him for
a variety of players and draft picks. In 200 0 the Grizzlies, once again exhibited signs of tanking,
although improving slightly overall, and once again gaining the number two overall pick. They
drafted Stromile Swift, a player who failed to live up to expectations of such a high draft pick. In
their final season in Vancouver, the Grizzlies once again improved slightly over the season, and
then saw their win percentage after once being eliminated from the playoffs. Their improved
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record netted them only the 6th overall pick in 2001, which they used to draft Shane Battier, a
very successful NBA player. The Grizzlies also traded for the 3 rd overall pick, using it to draft
Pau Gasol, who evolved into one of the best big men of the last 15 years. Led by Battier, and Pau
Gasol the Grizzlies were able to make 3 straight playoff appearances from the 2003-04 season to
the 2005-2006 season, although all these appearances ended in first round exits.
The Grizzlies did not demonstrate the familiar trend up and down trend of win percentage
as the previous teams had, as they consistently were very poor before eventually improving
significantly. They did improve in a familiar way however, through the draft. They were able to
obtain a solid player in Shane Battier, while also trading up for a top three draft pick, by trading
a previous top draft pick of theirs who had developed into a successful NBA player. Led this
draft pick, Paul Gasol, and Shane Battier they were able to improve markedly and become a
consistent playoff team. Tanking helped the Grizzlies receive so many high draft picks which
eventually they were able to translate into success.

Team by Team- Non-Tanking Teams
Chicago Bulls and Cleveland Cavaliers
The Chicago Bulls and Cleveland Cavaliers were the only teams over this 10-year span
that almost never saw their win percentage fall after elimination. Both teams struggled mightily
over this period however. Both teams struggles mostly came after the 1998 season, the Bulls
mostly did so due to the retirement of Michael Jordan in 1998. The graphs below shows each
teams win percentages, similar to the graphs for the teams above. A quick observation confirms
that neither team consistently got worse after elimination. With their win percentages only falling
after elimination three times between them over the 13 seasons they missed the playoffs. In the
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season (98-99) where Cleveland did not winning any games after elimination they only had three
games left to play.
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Because both teams performed so poorly overall over this span they were still able to
receive multiple draft picks in the top 3 to 5, especially the Chicago Bulls. However, both teams
failed to turn these draft picks into consistent improvement until the tail end of this study. The
Cavaliers were able to draft Lebron James with the 1 st overall pick in 2003, a player who would
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turn out to be the most dominant player in basketball over the next 13 years. The Bulls drafted
Ben Gordon with the 3rd overall pick in 2004. Gordon was named 6th man of the year in his first
season and was one of the team’s leading scorers for years to come. After the drafting of Gordon
the Bulls proceeded to make three straight playoff appearances.
The Bulls and the Cavaliers eventual success shows that tanking of this type is not the
only way to ensure high draft picks. As both teams rarely got worse after elimination yet were
both able to improve through the draft eventually. However, they do reiterate the importance of
gaining high draft picks, something that they may have been able to do more consistently if they
had engaged in tanking. They also show the importance of overall luck, as they the Cavaliers
were able to the first overall pick the year Lebron James entered the draft, a once in a lifetime
player.

Observations and Comparisons
In theory, gaining a high draft pick such as a top 3 or 5 pick should add substantially
more wins than other picks. If you look at the bar graphs of the teams studied above who were
identified as teams that possibly lost on purpose, there is a general trend of improvement in wins
after these seasons, even if it did not result in playoffs, or championship contention. There are
also instances of teams gaining high picks and failing to pick a player who would make any real
impact, this suggests that teams not only need to draft better, such as Michael Olowokandi and
Stromile Swift, but also work on player development, as we saw teams such as the Celtics trade a
way a future star (Billups) early without giving him a chance to develop properly. There is also
of course an element of luck involved, as the Celtics found were able to draft Paul Pierce with
the 10th pick, although this may have been helped by their tanking as they were able to move
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above teams in the lottery with losses after elimination. The Warriors also tanked obviously in
01-02, and only received 5th pick, but it turned out to be a star in Jason Richardson, the
following season they got the number 3 overall pick, and continued to improve to a playoff
appearance in 2007, although there success was short lived after this. Teams also traded away
picks for immediate talent in various instances, including the Steve Francis trade by the
Grizzlies, as well the Clippers trading their 2nd overall pick in 1995. The Clippers traded Brent
Barry, after a few promising seasons. The Grizzlies traded a very good point guard in Mike
Bibby after only three years. And, as mentioned above, Celtics successfully drafted a star in 1997
with top 3 pick, in the form of Billups, who would go on to be a 5-time All-Star, and lead a team
to an NBA title, traded him away, tie back into player development above. They also drafted
Ron mercer, who was a decent contributor at the NBA level and promptly traded him away after
two seasons, for a more veteran, NBA ready player.
The Bulls and Cavaliers, on the other hand, rarely exhibited signs of tanking. Their
overall poor performances season after season eventually allowed them to still land high draft
picks and draft players who would improve their performances. It is extremely important to
understand that there are other possible ways that a team could tank, so this data doesn’t
necessarily show that these two teams did not tank, but simply that they didn’t tank in the
manner we are looking at.

Conclusion
These results don’t show any concrete conclusions that tanking is a definite answer for a
team to necessarily compete in the NBA playoffs or for a championship, however they do show
that when teams land that one star talent in the draft they were able to improve their fortunes; and
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they gained these draft picks at least in part through tanking. And tanking, at the very least, can
only help to improve a team’s luck; the higher the draft picks the more likely you are to find a
star. The NBA clearly has a competitive balance issue that most likely cannot be fixed through
the draft alone; as noted earlier by the limited number of teams that have won a title. However, if
losing to win helps your team improve, it seems difficult to attack this approach, even if it is not
the most pleasing method to the masses.
The tanking teams studied show a fairly consistent trend of improving slightly following
years of poor performance (often tanking years), before once again performing poorly. The
graphs for each team confirm this as you can see their overall win percentage (denoted by the
line), consistently increasing then decreasing over few year periods. As stated previously, this
suggests, to some extent, that tanking does help teams improve, although not enough to make
them competitive for the playoffs. This supports the conclusion suggested at the outset of the
paper that good teams normally stay good and bad teams often stay bad, even when the bad
teams improve it is not enough to overtake the teams above them. In the instances where the
teams above did improve enough to have repeat playoff appearances it was due to them landing a
star in the draft. The Celtics were able to draft Paul Pierce, while the Grizzlies were able to
obtain Pau Gasol, two players who were perennial all stars from 2000 to 2010. Although the
Cavaliers, who are a bit of an outlier because they managed to draft Lebron James (the greatest
player of this generation), and Bulls were also able to improve and eventually make the playoffs
by acquiring a star in the draft, even without signs of this type of tanking, it still shows the
importance of gaining a star through the draft. Even if these two teams had no intention of
tanking in any form at all it still supports the idea that being bad helps you eventually be good.
This reiterates the importance of gaining that one star player, something that can done through
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gaining a top draft pick, and if tanking is able to increase a team’s odds to gain a top draft pick,
then it is a strategy that can help a team overall.
It is important to understand that tanking does not take place in the form of players not
trying, or the coaches even in many cases. As coaches and players jobs rely on money. Tanking
is a decision that is made by the front office executives. The paper above and other studies
analyzing tanking discuss teams losing after they are out of playoff contention. This method of
tanking most likely takes place through coaches being informed to simply not play their best
players. Players who might contribute more wins are simply ‘rested’. For a recent example, in
2015 with a few games left to play the Sacramento Kings made an announcements that its two
leadings scorers would not participate in their final games due to ‘health concerns’ despite both
being cleared of any injuries weeks ago.
The media and sports analysts alike have pointed to other forms of tanking that appear to
take place, although these are much harder to analyze and prove. As noted earlier, both the Bulls
and Cavaliers could easily have participated in other forms of tanking, such as trading away their
top players and putting out a team that was consistently below par compared to the rest of the
league. With this method a team sets out to perform poorly from the outset of the season so we
would not necessarily see a decrease in win percentage after elimination. Teams that are in the
middle of the pack and don’t appear to be serious playoff contenders often trade away their best
players in exchange for draft picks. This process gives the team more opportunities to gain talent
in the draft while also making the team perform worse in the following regular seasons, which
then leads to higher draft picks. This appears to something similar to what the Clippers did in
the study on them above, as they traded away their younger players once they had them for a few
years, in theory believing they were not good enough to compete, and deciding to rebuild again.
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In the present day NBA this a strategy the 76ers have use and that their general manager has
advocated; they have consistently developed their rookies before trading them away for more
draft picks in an effort to increase their odds of landing that one superstar in the draft that all
teams so desperately covet.
Overall, tanking has had a variety of causes and effects on the National Basketball
association. Competitive Balance is certainly an issue in this league and this has been seen as the
best method by some teams in order to overcome it. Although it is certainly not the end only
method that can be used, teams also most likely have to combine this with free agent talent and
effective drafting with later picks. Tanking is also something the fans clearly don’t want to see,
no one wants to root for a team that they perceive to be intentionally losing. Taylor and Trogdon
(year) suggested that the system used from 1985-1989, where each team was given an equal
chance to receive the 1st overall pick showed no signs of tanking, as teams had no incentive to
play worse. However, this system was changed in an effort to increase competitive balance as
teams that barely missed the playoffs were ending seasons with much higher picks than the
teams at the bottom of the league. Teams in this study got high draft picks (whether through
tanking or not) often improved, but never enough to win a championship, although Lebron and
the Cavaliers did reach a final, suggesting that the draft process is not the answer to fixing the
competitive balance issues in the NBA. These issues may lie elsewhere in the league, whether it
be through the free agency system or it may be that the NBA will always be a league where few
teams contend for the title year after year because of the luck of gaining that one superstar who
can carry a team to title contention throughout an entire decade.
More in-depth research on teams benching their best players towards the end of the
season when there is nothing to play for might provide insight onto whether or not tanking exists
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on a greater scale. While, another study focus on front offices that make the decisions to tank
before seasons even start would also offer another interesting point of view, although, admittedly
this is much more difficult to dissect and prove.
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